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627.89

$421.58
$421.58
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77.67
60.86
60.86

Violations
per firm,
Violationsper
firm,V
State
State
Federal
Federal

.263
.263
.123
.123

.263
.263
.136
.136

.225
.225
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1976
1976

1977
1977
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p
Jl
(12
a2

3.48*
3.48*
221.21
*
221.21*"

3.96*
3.96*
47.30*
47.30*

4.00*
4.00*
79.07*
79.07*

Average
F1
fine, F1
Average serious fine,

1Jl
(12
a2

2.15**
2.15**
215.05*
215.05*

.16
2.17*
2.17*

1.04*
1.04*
3.63*
3.63*

F2
Average
fine, F2,
Average nonserious fine,

Jl

a2

1.30
1.30
1000.14*
1000.14*

.33
.33
15.18*
15.18*

1.56
1.56
42.72*
42.72*

J1.
p
(12
a2

2.93*
2.93*
10.51*
10.51*

2.70*
2.70*
3.27*
3.27*
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6.02*
6.02*

(12
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displays the
the estimated
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coefficients of rank
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correlation for
for the
the null
null
Table
rank
is
not
enforcement
hypothesis
that
the
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enforcement
parameters
rank
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parameters
hypothesisthat the employment
correlated between
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adjoining years.
years. There
There exists
exists no exception
exception to the
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rule that
that
correlated
there exists
exists positive
positive and
and significant
significant rank
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correlation between
between the
the employment
employment
there
parameters in
in adjoining
adjoining years.
years. In
In six
six of the
the eight
eight cases
cases the
the correlation
correlation is
of parameters
is
the
correlation
where
higher
under
state
programming.
The
two
cases
where
the
correlation
The
two
cases
higher under state programming.
higher .under
federal programming
programming are
are for
for penalty
penalty parameters.
parameters.
underfederal
higher
Tests of rank
rank correlation
correlation supports
supports the
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hypothesis that
that state
state programs
programs offer
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Tests
and therefore
over time
firms aa more
more stable
regulatory environment
time and
therefore less
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environmentover
stable regulatory
firms
This
that
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than
do
federal
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that
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Table
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coefficientsbetween
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Table3.
adjoining
adjoiningyears
years
Parameter
Parameter

Adjoining
Adjoining years
years

Probability
inspection, P
Probability of inspection,

1975 +
1976
1975
+ 1976
1977
1976 +
1976
+ 1977

Average
serious fine,
fine, F
Average serious
F11

1976
1975 +
1975
+ 1976
1977
1976 +
1976
+ 1977

Average
2
nonserious fine,
fine, F
Average nonserious
F2

1976
1975 +
1975
+ 1976
1976 +
1977
1976
+ 1977

Violations per
V
firm, V
per firm,

1975 +
1976
1975
+ 1976
1976 +
1977
1976
+ 1977

** denotes significance
level
at .01
.01 level
significance at
**
at .05
level.
.05 level.
** denotes significance
significance at
t-values
in parentheses.
t-values in
parentheses.

State

Federal
Federal

.84*
.84*
(6.71)
(6.71)
.77*
.77*
(5.27)
(5.27)

.57*
.57*
(3.73)
(3.73)
.70*
.70*
(5.25)
(5.25)

.49*
.49*
(3.02)
(3.02)
.75*
.75*
(4.87)
(4.87)

.52*
.52*
(3.27)
(3.27)
.33**
.33**
(2.20)
(2.20)

.38**
.38**
(2.25)
(2.25)
.71*
.71*
(4.39)
(4.39)

.43**
.43**
(2.48)
(2.48)
.48**
.48**
(2.53)
(2.53)

.85*
.85*
(6.72)
(6.72)
.90*
.90*
(8.89)
(8.89)

.55*
.55*
(2.85)
(2.85)
.72*
.72*
(4.96)
(4.96)

stringency among
programs by
by states
stable under
under state
state
statesis
is more
morestable
stringency
among regulatory
regulatoryprograms
programming. Therefore,
by electing
electing to operate
operate their
their own
own programs,
programs,
Therefore,states,
states,by
programming.
part of the
program, on
rnay
to firms.
firms.The
Thefederal
on
decreasepart
the costs
costs of regulation
federalprogram,
regulationto
maydecrease
the
the other
has
operated
under
four
different
administrators,
each
of
other hand,
has
under
four
different
each
hand,
administrators,
operated
whomhad
whom
to
change
the
focus
of
the
enforcement
program.
In
this
had attempted
the
focus
the
In
enforcement
this
attempted change
program.
sense
program produces
produces greater
greater uncertainty
sense the
the federal
federalprogram
costs than
than state
state
uncertaintycosts
programs.
programs.

3. Conclusion
3.
Conclusion

The public
public policy
policy implication
The
thatis
is drawn
fromthese
drawnfrom
thesetests
testsis that
mattersto
thatit matters
implicationthat
firms
which
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